In this paper, we describe a new authentication service for securing mobile ad hoc network (MANET) routing protocols. A MANET authentication extension (MAE) is appended to each routing protocol message. Our design includes a self-organized certification service, adapted from [6] with the following improvements: appropriated initialization, correcting vulnerabilities in the original design; local certificate management; and support to multiple Certification Authorities. Our design is policy-configurable in the sense that certification and authentication services may be adjusted according to specific security requirements. We discuss the use of MAE and certification service for securing DSR, AODV, OLSR and TBRPF MANET routing protocols. We have implemented the MAE securing OLSR and we evaluate computational and network requirements for this case.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we tackle the problem of securing ad hoc network routing protocols. An authentication service is considered as a basic preventive protection for the routing protocol. Our proposal consists in the definition of a MANET authentication extension (MAE) to be appended to each routing protocol message or packet, providing the authentication service. The salient features of our design, differentiating the work presented in this paper from prior published results [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] are: (1) protocol-independent authentication extension design, (2) policy configurable authentication service definition and, (3) design of a certification service adapted to the MANET context.
Concerning the protocol-independent design, we aim to provide a security solution that could be easily adapted and extended to provide authentication service to different MANET routing protocols. This is different from previous work, in the sense that, instead of focusing on a specific protocol and even specifying changes to the original protocol, we design a general authentication protocol that is accurate in form and procedures, while guarding direct extensibility (by simple instantiation of more specialized authentication objects) and semantic flexibility, allowing adaptation with the protocol-specific needs.
Regarding the configuration of the authentication service, our objective is to allow the service to be configured according to the particular requirements of a specific security policy. Our design is different from most previous work by giving post-design configuration options that could map different security requirements. This feature is particularly related to the diversity on the MANET application, which results in different scenarios with different security requirements.
The design of a simple authentication extension mechanism is not enough to provide a complete routing protocol security solution, as such design usually rely on some key distribution scheme. Moreover, in the MANET context, this scheme must be provided in a completely distributed manner and should be, as much as possible, self-organized 1 . The design of a conjugate key distribution scheme is an important part of the overall security solution, although in previous work this is presumed [4] or delegated to classical solutions [3] , which do not meet the specific MANETs requirements. Therefore, we have designed a certification service that has distribution and self-organization features. The rationale of our proposal is adapted from [6] , with the following improvements: (1) appropriated initialization conditions (correcting some flaws in [6] , which is vulnerable to sybil attacks [7] ); (2) certificate distribution and management services; and (3) support to multiple Certification Authorities (CA) and trust path construction. This last feature is mandatory if secure communications are needed between nodes originating from different MANETs (merging of two MANETs).
In this paper, We show how to adopt the proposed solution for securing the four MANET routing protocol standard candidates: DSR [8] , AODV [9] , OLSR [10] and TBRPF [11] . To validate our design, we have implemented both authentication and certification services for securing the OLSR routing protocol; we present here the implementation and some experimental results.
MANET CERTIFICATION SERVICE
The design of self-organized certification services in MANET has been discussed in a few recent papers [6, 13, 14, 15] . The approaches in [6, 13, 14] are all based on a distributed certification authority (DCA) trust model. The CA private key (K CA ) is used to sign certificates for the nodes in the MANET. A certificate signed with K CA can be readily verified with the well-known system public key. The distribution of the CA capabilities is achieved by sharing K CA among network nodes by means of threshold cryptography [16] . Each node holds a private-key-share (SK CA ) and any K (a system wide constant, usually related to the average number of neighbors) of such SK CA holders can collectively function as a CA. The K CA , however, is not recoverable by any node. Counter-certificate issuing does certificate revocation, which must also be signed with K CA . All nodes keep a local Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with all non-expired counter-certificates. Our proposal is based on [6, 13] , with the following improvements: (1) Certification issuing and renewal in [6, 13] follows some pre-established rule. In our design, we propose a set of policy configurable options for certificate issuing and renewal, and private-key-share issuing and updating. This policy may be used to enforce that new certificate and SK CA issuing in the DCA follow strictly the same identity verification that an equivalent centralized CA, avoiding multiple identity tampering attacks (Sybil attacks) [7] . (2) Approaches described in [6, 13] do not specify how certificates are acquired in each node. Also, the local CRL is progressively built by accumulating countercertificates that are flooded when they are signed, but the synchronization of arriving nodes is left unspecified. We propose the localized maintenance of a certificate cache and CRL. (3) Designs from [6, 13] are based on a single DCA. We extend the model to support multiple DCA and trust path constructions.
Certificate Issuing and Renewal
A node without certificate or needing to renew his certificate must ask to other nodes in the MANET for a certificate issuing. The authentication policy must specify how the nodes receiving a certificate request serve such request. Different policies can be specified for certificate issuing and renewal, which includes: (1) serve according to some policy-specified identity check, such as [12] ; (2) serve manually (the user is prompted to decide if certificate request can be served); (3) deny (certificate request are rejected and an error message is returned to requester); (4) reject (certificate request is silently discarded); and (5) other (user defined).
Local Certificate Cache and CRL
In our design, building, synchronization and management of local certificate databases are setup depending on the type of the routing protocol being used. Options for certificate management includes: choice for proactive or on-demand construction of local certificate cache and CRL; time for keeping an unused certificate in the cache; and maximum size for the certificate cache.
Proactive certificate distribution consists in requiring the sender to attach his certificate along with the messages being transmitted. If certificates are transmitted with all messages, we have maximum certificate availability. However, it also implies considerable network and processing overhead, as a certificate is transmitted and must be validated for each message. Some optimization can be introduced by caching recently validated certificates and requiring the sender to attach his certificate only in some of the messages he originates.
Alternatively, nodes can cache recently validated certificates and explicitly ask other nodes for certificates that are needed but not available in the cache. In this reactive certificate distribution, sender does not attach his certificate in the message but only provides it when explicitly queried. The certificate owner is not the only one who can serve a certificate query, as other nodes having the needed certificate in their cache can also answer the query. Finally, a hybrid proactive-reactive policy is also possible.
A synchronization strategy is needed to allow roaming/arriving nodes to have their local CRL updated. Reactive and proactive approaches are possible. In the reactive approach, a roaming/arriving node explicitly query his neighbors for a copy of the up-to-date CRL, while in the proactive approach nodes identifying messages from some node with a revoked certificate should broadcast the counter-certificate in its neighborhood.
Usage with Multiple DCA
Nodes trusting and being trusted by more than one CA should apply for certificate and private-key-shares from each CA. A cross trust relation between the nodes trusting in two different CAs (e.g. CA1 and CA2) can be established if there are, at least, k nodes trusting both CAs. This is done by generating a certificate for CA1 and a certificate for CA2 that are signed by k private-keyshares from CA2 and CA1, respectively. The CAs certificates generated in this processes should be flooded in the network, finalizing the cross trust relation establishing. Establishment of cross trust relation is also controlled by the certification policy.
MANET AUTHENTICATION SERVICE
The authentication service considered in our model is provided by a MANET authentication extension (MAE), which is appended to each routing protocol message or packet. This MAE contains all the authentication information required to correctly assure authenticity and integrity to the message or packet being protected. Our objective is to design such extension in a flexible and adaptable way, so that it could be used to secure different MANET routing protocols. We leave the routing protocol unchanged, differently from [2,3,4].
Authentication Objects
MAE is composed by authentication objects. At least one (mandatory) authentication object must be present in the MAE and contains a message authentication code (MAC), which is computed as a hash-function applied to the data being authenticated keyed with a secret shared team key, or a digital signature (DS). MAC/DS authenticates all the non-mutable in the packet/message. Additional authentication objects are used to provide optional services. Currently defined options are signer certificate (certificate distribution), hash chains (mutable fields protection) and sequence number (reply protection).
Mutable Fields
In DSR and AODV there are messages that progressively change while they are forwarded by intermediate nodes in the path between message source and destination [8, 9] . While it is desirable that this mutable information should also be protected, such protection usually implies in increasing the authentication information size each time the message is forwarded. This is not surprising as the information contained in the message is due to all nodes that have previously forwarded it and, each of them should be authenticated. Methods to protect typical mutable information (e.g. hop-count, IP address routing trace, etc.) have been proposed [2, 3] and are adapted here.
MAE for DSR, AODV, OLSR and TBRPF
OLSR and TBRPF are proactive link-state routing protocols whose messages don't have mutable fields in the routing messages that are actually used by the routing protocol algorithm. MAE for securing OLSR and TBRPF is simply built with a single MAC or DS.
AODV have mutable fields in route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP). These fields are hop-count metrics that changes every time the packet is forwarded by nodes between the message source and destination. A hash chain object (HC) [4] is included and updated each time these fields change. Such protection avoids that an attacker could decrement the hop count. Route error (RERR) messages are signed only by the node forwarding them. Route reply acknowledgments (RREP-ACK) have no mutable fields and are only authenticated by the message originator.
Securing DSR is quite more complex, although limited security can be achieved by combining the mandatory authentication object with a hash chain object implementing a per-hop hashing schema in RREQ messages. This will avoid an attacker from faking of the initiator node and from removing correct IP address in the route list [2] . RREP messages could be simply signed by the target of the route discovery (e.g. the node originating the RREP message). Table 1 illustrates the main features of each MANET routing protocol and MAE requirements for each of them. 
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
MAE authentication services where implemented for the available implementation of OLSR (v.3). The openssl library was used for cryptography routines. Tests were executed with both shared secret key and digital signatures authentication systems. In the second case, a "proactive" certificate distribution and CRL synchronization were configured. A 512 bits RSA key was defined. Both certificate and MAE digital signatures were using an MD5 with RSA signature algorithm. Certificates were issued in the X.509 format. Minimal information was included in the certificate, aiming to reduce its size. Timeout for excluding a valid certificate cache from the local certificate database was set to 10 times the HELLO cycle. All certificates were previously issued out-of-band. Issuing policy was set to "reject" in the case of new certificates and to "always" in the case of certificate renewal. Number of nodes in certification service coalition was fixed to K = 3.
Computational
and Network Performance Considerations: Overhead of the proposed protocols has been preliminarily evaluated, through our experiments with the OLSR implementation. Considering the network overhead, MAE transmitted (without certificates) have a fixed size of 72 bytes. Average size of OLSR messages depends on the network size and density. The average size of a HELLO message is 62 bytes, each node having an average neighborhood of 12 nodes. Computational overhead were indirectly evaluate. The most expensive operation in MAE generation and verification is RSA signature and verification, respectively. Time for executing a RSA signature generation and verification (512-bits key) were averaged in a Pentium III (900MHz, 128Mbytes de RAM, running Linux with kernel 2.4.7) to 9ms and 2.6ms, respectively. Storage requirements of our proposal are mainly related to certificate cache storage (as CRL can not oversize K, a small constant). If all certificates in the 100 nodes MANET being simulated were locally cached, a 26kbyte cache is due, which is perfectly reasonable.
CONCLUSION
We have designed certification and authentication services to secure MANET routing protocols. Our design is protocol-independent and post-design options allow accomplishing of different security contexts/policies. An implementation has been realized for the OLSR protocol to demonstrate the feasibility and provide preliminary evaluation of computational and network aspects of the designed protocols. The important key management problem is treated as part of security solution and not simply presumed as in many of the prior published works.
